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Abstract  
 
In recent years, several authors have reconstructed the relationship between 20th 
century economic theory and neuro-psychological research in terms of a three-
stage narrative of initial unity, increasing separation and ongoing reunification. In 
this article, I draw on major developments in economic theory and neuro-
psychological research to provide a descriptive and normative critique of this 
reconstruction. Moreover, I put forward a reconstruction of the relationship 
between economics and neuro-psychology that, I claim, better fits both the 
available empirical evidence and the methodological foundations of these 
disciplines. In doing so, I argue that recent calls to develop a unified 
interdisciplinary framework for modelling choice are premised on disputable 
presuppositions concerning both the domain of economic theory and the 
relationship between this theory’s axiomatic foundations and empirical findings 
about the neuro-psychological substrates of choice. 
 
Keywords: Economic Theory; Psychology; Interdisciplinary Unification; 
Rational Choice; Neuroeconomics. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The philosophical and methodological literature on the relationship between 20th 
century economic theory and neuro-psychological research has grown remarkably 
during the last three decades (see e.g. Earl, 1990, Giocoli, 2003, Hands, 2010, and 
Hausman, 1992 and 2008). Several authors (e.g. Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 
Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004, and Lewin, 1996) have reconstructed this 
relationship in terms of the following three-stage narrative (henceforth, the 
‘standard view’). First, we find an early period of unity, going approximately 
from the marginal revolution in the 1870s to the 1910s, during which neoclassical 
economic theory was grounded on psychological foundations. Second, there is a 
phase of increasing separation, prompted by developments in ordinal utility 
theory and revealed preference theory, culminated in the 1950s with the 
elimination of psychological findings, constructs and methods from mainstream 
economic theory. Finally, the systematic violations of mainstream economic 
theory documented since the 1950s fostered an ongoing reunification between 
economics and neuro-psychology, which builds on advances in behavioural, 
experimental and neuroeconomics to provide a unified interdisciplinary 
framework for modelling choice. The idea is that economists and neuro-
psychologists can and should draw on a common set of findings, constructs and 
methods to model choice (see e.g. Gintis, 2004, Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, 
Lewin, 1996, and Rabin, 1998). 
 
In this article, I draw on major developments in economic theory and neuro-
psychological research to provide a descriptive and normative critique of this 
standard view. Moreover, I put forward a reconstruction of the relationship 
between economics and neuro-psychology that, I claim, better fits both the 
available empirical evidence and the methodological foundations of these 
disciplines. I shall argue for three claims of general interest to the philosophers 
and the practitioners of those disciplines. First, contrary to the standard view, 
neoclassical economic theory was not grounded on psychological foundations. 
Second, the standard view significantly overstates economics’ alleged separation 
from psychology and implausibly downplays the role psychological findings, 
constructs and methods have played in 20th century economic theorizing. And 
third, the increasing integration between economics and neuro-psychology does 
not license the standard view’s claim that a reunification between these 
disciplines is under way. In particular, recent calls for interdisciplinary 
unification are premised on disputable presuppositions concerning both the 
domain of economic theory and the relationship between this theory’s axiomatic 
foundations and empirical findings about the neuro-psychological substrates of 
choice.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I shall use the terms ‘unification’ and ‘reunification’ interchangeably. Which of these 
two terms is more appropriate depends on whether economics and neuro-psychology 
were unified in the first place. If my thesis that these disciplines were not unified is 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the standard view’s three-
stage reconstruction of the relationship between 20th century economic theory and 
neuro-psychological research, including recent developments in neuroeconomics. 
Section 2 combines historical and methodological considerations to articulate a 
descriptive evaluation of this reconstruction. Section 3 puts forward a normative 
evaluation of recent calls to develop a unified interdisciplinary framework for 
modelling choice, focusing on these calls’ presuppositions concerning the domain 
and the axiomatic foundations of economic theory. 
 
Before proceeding, three points are worth emphasizing. First, economics and 
neuro-psychology are far from being monolithic disciplines with immutable 
boundaries. In fact, different research programs have been regarded as part of 
economics and neuro-psychology during the history of these disciplines (see e.g. 
Hands, 2010). This variability complicates the task of reconstructing the 
interdisciplinary relationships between economics and neuro-psychology, but 
does not preclude us from accurately reconstructing the relationship between 
specific research programs within those disciplines. In what follows, I use the 
terms ‘economics’ and ‘neuro-psychology’ to indicate the sets of works within 
these disciplines that are directly concerned with the modelling of individual 
choice. This use is deliberately broad to encompass the wide range of works (e.g. 
psycho-physiological studies of valuation, consumer choice theory and expected 
utility theory) discussed by the proponents of the standard view. However, I shall 
make such use more precise whenever my remarks apply to specific subsets of 
these works (see e.g. Section 2 on consumer choice theory and Section 3 on 
expected utility theory). 
 
Second, philosophers have proposed various conceptions of interdisciplinary 
unification, which respectively encompass the ontology, vocabulary, and other 
elements of the involved disciplines (see e.g. Grantham, 2004, and Wylie, 1999). 
In this paper, I explicate the notion of interdisciplinary unification in terms of 
findings, constructs and methods. I do so both because these three elements figure 
prominently in the writings of the standard view’s proponents (see Sections 1-2) 
and because consideration of those three elements can yield informative insights 
about the relationship between economics and neuro-psychology (see Sections 2-
3). Finally, my aim is not just to evaluate some entrenched conceptualizations of 
the relationship between economics and neuro-psychology, but also to foster a 
more systematic understanding of this relationship. Below I primarily target 
philosophical and methodological issues regarding the relationship between 
economics and neuro-psychology, without engaging in historical debates 
concerning the exact timing or the number of stages that putatively characterize 
such relationship. In particular, I shall refer to the specialized historical literature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
correct, then the increasing integration between economics and neuro-psychology may 
foster at most unification (rather than reunification) between these disciplines. 
	   4	  
insofar as doing so helps to contextualize and clarify my philosophical and 
methodological remarks. 
 
 
1. Economics and Neuro-Psychology: the Standard View  
 
 
According to the standard view, neoclassical economic theory was “deeply rooted 
in psychological theories of pain and pleasure” (Padoa-Schioppa, 2008, 451) and 
“the psychology of sensation” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 147). On this view, 
introspection constituted a reliable source of evidence to validate the basic 
principles of neoclassical economic theory (see e.g. Lewin, 1996, and Bruni and 
Guala, 2001). Moreover, psycho-physiological findings concerning the relation 
between individual hedonic feelings and external physical stimuli provided 
additional empirical support for those principles (see e.g. Colander, 2007, and 
Sent, 2004). For instance, Edgeworth mentioned psycho-physiological findings 
such as the Fechner-Weber Law as “supporting evidence” for his thesis that 
“pleasure is measurable, and all pleasures are commensurable” (1881, 59). Jevons 
went as far as to contend that pleasure and pain “are undoubtedly the ultimate 
objects of the Calculus of Economics” (1871, III.1).2 
 
By the end of the 19th century, however, the reliability of introspective 
psychology and the collected psycho-physiological findings was severely 
questioned (see e.g. James, 1890, vol. II). After the turn of the century, a growing 
number of authors advocated a behaviourist approach to psychology, which 
aimed to explain human behaviour (including choice) solely in terms of external 
physical stimuli and observable responses (see e.g. Watson, 1913). The 
increasing prominence of behaviourism, combined with economists’ ambition to 
build their theory of choice on a rigorous evidential basis, prompted several 
authors to develop “an alternative foundation for the theory of choice […] free of 
any psychological assumptions” (Sugden, 1991, 757). This ‘escape’ from 
psychology, in turn, led to the gradual elimination of psychological findings, 
constructs and methods from mainstream economic theory by the mid-20th 
century (see e.g. Giocoli, 2003, ch.2, and Kahneman and Sugden, 2005). 
 
I am not concerned here with providing a comprehensive historical reconstruction 
of these disciplinary developments. For the purpose of my evaluation, I briefly 
outline the standard view’s reconstruction of three major building blocks of 
economics’ purported ‘escape’, namely the ordinalist contributions of Pareto 
([1909] 1971) and Hicks and Allen (1934), the development of revealed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Psychology is not the only discipline that has been claimed to provide inspiration and 
empirical support to neoclassical economists (see e.g. Fisher, [1892] 1925, for some 
parallels between utility and the physical notion of potential energy). I mention these 
parallels in passing since they are orthogonal to my remarks about the relationship 
between economics and psychology.	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preference theory by Samuelson (1938a) and Houthakker (1950), and the 
axiomatic achievements of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and Savage 
(1954). 
 
On the standard view, leading neoclassical economists regarded utility as a 
cardinally measurable magnitude that captures the strength of individuals’ 
preferences between different options. In his Manuale, Pareto ([1909] 1971) 
demonstrated that the results of consumer choice theory could be derived without 
assuming that utility is cardinally measurable in this sense. In particular, he 
showed that if one assumes that individuals are able to rank combinations of 
goods, utility can be given an ordinal measure that captures individuals’ 
preference rankings in the sense that, if an individual prefers one combination of 
goods over another, then the former yields higher utility (see e.g. Moscati, 
2013a).3 Hicks and Allen (1934) endorsed Pareto’s aim to make consumer choice 
theory independent of assumptions concerning the cardinal measurability of 
utility. At the same time, they criticized Pareto for employing notions (e.g. 
marginal utility) that were still based on cardinalist assumptions. Moreover, they 
attempted to construct consumer choice theory without making any assumption 
concerning the cardinal measurability of utility. To this end, they relinquished the 
notion of marginal utility and based their analyses on the marginal rate of 
substitution, which they claimed to be measurable from behavioural observations 
without making direct reference to utility. 
 
In his ‘Note on the pure theory of consumer’s behaviour’, Samuelson praised 
Hicks and Allen for eliminating the “unnecessarily restrictive” assumption that 
utility is cardinally measurable (1938a, 61). Even so, he held that their analysis 
showed “vestigial traces of the utility concept”, and criticized their assumption 
that the marginal rate of substitution is negative and decreasing as “ambiguous” 
and “artificial” (ibid., 61-2). To drop off the last ‘vestigial traces’ of utility 
analysis, Samuelson developed revealed preference theory, which builds on 
specific consistency conditions to model consistent choice patterns without 
making substantive psychological assumptions (see e.g. Little, 1950, ch.1-3). 
More specifically, Samuelson (1938a) demonstrated that if a complete and 
transitive preference ordering can be constructed from an agent’s choices 
between pairs of bundles, then this agent’s choices satisfy what was later called 
the weak axiom of revealed preference. Houthakker (1950) extended 
Samuelson’s result from choices between pairs of bundles to choices over series 
of bundles. In particular, he demonstrated that if an agent’s choices satisfy the so-
called strong axiom of revealed preferences, then her choices reveal a complete 
and transitive preference ordering (for a formal exposition of these results and 
their interrelations, see e.g. Kihlstrom et al., 1976). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For the purpose of my exposition, I follow the widespread use of the expression 
‘cardinal utility’ to indicate various measures of utility stronger than ordinal utility. For 
more fine-grained taxonomies of distinct measures of utility, see e.g. Moscati, 2013b.	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Towards the half of the 20th century, the development of expected utility theory 
(henceforth, EUT) and subjective EUT provided economists with a rigorous 
axiomatic framework for modelling choice in conditions of risk and uncertainty 
respectively.4 More specifically, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) proved a 
representation theorem stating that if an agent’s preferences satisfy specific 
consistency axioms - namely completeness, transitivity, continuity and 
independence - then there exists a utility function unique up to positive linear 
transformations, such that for any two options, the one preferred is assigned 
higher expected utility.5 Savage (1954) built on this result to demonstrate that a 
complete preference relation that satisfies further consistency axioms can be 
represented as if the agent maximizes expected utility relative to a unique 
subjective probability function. These mathematical achievements enabled 
economists to model consistent choice patterns without making substantive 
psychological assumptions. This, in turn, ideally completed economics’ alleged 
separation from psychology (see e.g. Giocoli, 2005). 
 
The proponents of the standard view frequently criticize the disciplinary 
developments that putatively led to economics’ separation from psychology. For 
instance, Lewin contends that economists’ adherence to behaviourism “placed 
economics in a straightjacket” that precluded progress at the interface between 
economics and other decision sciences (1996, 1313). Similarly, Bruni and Sugden 
allege that economics’ separation from psychology “may have diverted 
economics from a path of development” (2007, 147). Fortunately, the standard 
view goes, a series of contributions at the interface between economics and 
neuro-psychology “reverse [the] fundamental shift” prompted by this separation 
(ibid., 146). These contributions build on neuro-psychological findings, 
constructs and methods to foster a gradual reunification between economics and 
neuro-psychology. The idea is that economists and neuro-psychologists can and 
should draw on a common set of findings, constructs and methods to model 
choice (see e.g. Gintis, 2004, Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, Lewin, 1996, and 
Rabin, 1998). Three research programs have been claimed to provide especially 
significant contributions to the alleged reunification between economics and 
neuro-psychology. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 An agent faces a situation of risk when she ignores which outcome will obtain as a 
result of her choice, but knows both what outcomes may obtain and each of these 
outcomes’ probability of obtaining. An agent faces a situation of uncertainty when she 
ignores not just which outcome will obtain, but also some outcomes’ probability of 
obtaining.	  
5 An agent’s preferences are complete if and only if the agent is always able to express 
definite preferences regarding the options she faces, i.e. for any two options x and y, x ≥ y 
V y ≥ x. An agent’s preferences are transitive if and only if, for any options x, y and z, (x 
≥ y ^ y ≥ z) → x ≥ z. Continuity requires that, if option x is preferred to another option y 
but is not preferred to a third option z, then there exists a compound lottery over y and z 
which is indifferent to x, i.e. if z ≥ x ≥ y, there exists α є [0, 1] such that x ~ [αy; (1-α)z]. 
Independence requires that adding a common component to each side of a choice relation 
does not change preferences, i.e. if x ≥ y, then [αx; (1-α)z] ≥ [αy; (1-α)z] ∀ α є [0,1].	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First, behavioural economics purports to “reunify psychology and economics” by 
improving “the realism of the psychological assumptions underlying economic 
theory” (Camerer, 1999, 10575; see also Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). The 
idea can be explicated as follows. Standard economic theory posits agents having 
implausibly sophisticated cognitive and computational abilities (e.g. think of the 
ability to calculate the expected utility of the available options using perfect 
Bayesian updating with negligible cognitive costs). However, real-life individuals 
have a number of cognitive and computational limitations, which cause 
systematic deviations between their choices and the predictions of standard 
economic theory. Fortunately, psychological findings enable economists to build 
theories that make more plausible assumptions concerning individuals’ abilities 
and thereby fit individuals’ choices better than standard economic theory. 
Therefore, economists should use psychological findings in constructing and 
revising their theories. As Rabin put it, “the underlying premise of [behavioural 
economics] is far too compelling to consider it transitory: ceteris paribus, the 
more realistic our assumptions about economic actors, the better our economics. 
Hence, economists should aspire to make our assumptions about humans as 
psychologically realistic as possible” (2002, 658).6 
 
Second, experimental economics vastly increases the array of observational tools 
and investigative methods available to economists (see e.g. Bardsley et al., 2010, 
for a review). Experimental studies have been claimed to advance economic 
analyses in several respects, ranging from discriminating between competing 
economic models (see e.g. Guala, 2005, and Smith, 1994) to testing the 
robustness of economic theories’ implications across diverse experimental 
conditions (see e.g. Loomes et al., 2003, and Smith, 2002). In recent years, 
experimental studies have been put forward not just to test standard economic 
theory, but also to develop more predictive and explanatory theories. In this 
respect, it is worth mentioning the so-called exhibits, experimental designs that 
generate empirical regularities at odds with standard economic theory and suggest 
possible ways of revising such theory (see e.g. Sugden, 2005; see also Section 3.2 
for discussion). 
 
Finally, neuroeconomics aims to complete the reunification between economics 
and neuro-psychology by combining these disciplines’ findings, constructs and 
methods into a unified framework for modelling choice (see e.g. Camerer, 2008). 
Neuroeconomics expands behavioural economics by measuring and manipulating 
variables (e.g. neural correlates of decisions) that behavioural economists were 
formerly unable to observe. Moreover, it expands experimental economics by 
supplementing the array of observational tools and investigative methods 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Behavioural economics encompasses a vast variety of works, including Simon’s (1955) 
studies of bounded rationality, Kahneman et al.’s (1982) investigations of heuristics and 
biases, and Gigerenzer et al.’s (1999) ecological rationality approach. I expand on some 
of these works and their interrelations in Section 3. 
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employed by experimental economists with innovative brain-imaging and brain-
stimulation instruments. The proponents of neuroeconomics frequently claim to 
advance economic modelling by building more predictive and explanatory 
models of choice. Some manifest the ambition to develop “a single, general 
theory of human behaviour” (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, 447; see also 
Glimcher, 2011, 4). This, in turn, is said to “complete the research program [of] 
the early classics” (Rustichini, 2005, 203) and fulfil Jevons’ and Edgeworth’s 
ambition to “reground economic behaviour in […] cognitive neuroscience” 
(Quartz, 2008, 460).7 
 
 
2. Descriptive Evaluation 
 
 
As outlined in the previous section, several authors reconstruct the relationship 
between 20th century economic theory and neuro-psychological research as a 
three-stage process of initial unity, increasing separation and ongoing 
reunification. In this section, I combine historical and methodological 
considerations to provide a descriptive evaluation of this ‘standard view’. I shall 
argue for three main claims. First, contrary to the standard view, neoclassical 
economic theory was not grounded on psychological foundations. Second, the 
standard view significantly overstates economics’ alleged separation from 
psychology and implausibly downplays the role psychological findings, 
constructs and methods have played in 20th century economic theorizing. And 
third, the increasing integration between economics and neuro-psychology does 
not license the standard view’s claim that a reunification between these 
disciplines is under way. 
 
According to the standard view, leading neoclassical economists aimed to make 
their theory’s assumptions “broadly compatible with what were then recent 
findings in psychophysics” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 149; see also Colander, 
2007). Furthermore, “neoclassical economics, as practised by [some of its] 
pioneers, was based on empirical hypotheses about human psychology” (Sugden, 
2009, 859; see also Sent, 2004). These observations are correct, but imply neither 
that “the psychology of sensation was an essential part of economics” (Bruni and 
Sugden, 2007, 154) nor that “economics and psychology are essentially siblings 
separated at birth” (Loewenstein et al., 2008, 648-9). In particular, one may 
consistently hold that some neoclassical economists made substantive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Calls for interdisciplinary unification target other disciplines besides neuro-psychology. 
For instance, Lewin advocates unification across economics and sociology on the alleged 
ground that “we cannot even begin to formulate a more realistic psychological 
foundation for economics, if we do not recognize the social forces that influence human 
decision making” (1996, 1320; see also Ross, 2014, ch.5). I gloss over these claims since 
my evaluation focuses on unificationist calls at the interface between economics and 
neuro-psychology.	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psychological assumptions, and yet deny that neoclassical economic theory itself 
rested on psychological foundations (see e.g. Hands, 2010, for similar remarks 
regarding hedonistic psychology). As Fisher put it, economics is not in the 
business to “build a theory of psychology”, and does not investigate whether the 
antecedent of choice is pleasure or some other mental state ([1892] 1925, 11). 
 
Indeed, even those neoclassical economists who made psycho-physiological 
assumptions doubted the prospects of the project to ground economic theory on 
psychological foundations. For instance, Jevons held that pleasure and pain are in 
principle measurable in psycho-physiological terms (1871, 4), and maintained 
that “no apparent limit exists to the success of scientific method in weighing and 
measuring […] the phenomena [of the] mind” ([1874] 1958, 735-6). Still, he put 
forward rather sceptical assertions concerning the prospects of measuring 
pleasure and pain directly in psycho-physiological terms. As he famously 
claimed, “I hesitate to say that men will ever have the means of measuring 
directly the feelings of the human heart […] It is from the quantitative effects of 
the feelings that we must estimate their comparative amounts” (1871, 11). That is 
to say, even the economists who occupy centre stage in the standard view made 
contentions that do not fit well the standard view’s claim that neoclassical 
economic theory was grounded on psychological foundations. 
 
What about the separation that, on the standard view, led to the gradual 
elimination of psychology from economic theory by the mid-20th century? Prima 
facie, the standard view’s reconstruction of this alleged separation may seem to 
fit both the claims of leading economists of the time and entrenched 
interpretations of these economists’ works (see e.g. Bruni and Guala, 2001, on 
Pareto). Moreover, as noted in Section 1, a series of mathematical achievements 
enabled economists to represent consistent choice patterns without making 
substantive psychological assumptions. These achievements constituted major 
developments in 20th century economic theory, but should not be taken to indicate 
that psychological findings, constructs and methods were eliminated from such 
theory. On the contrary, psychological findings, constructs and methods figured 
prominently both in works at the interface between economics and psychology 
and in mainstream economic theorizing. To illustrate this, let us focus on some 
often-cited proponents of economics’ alleged separation from psychology. 
 
In his works, Pareto remarked that economists have “a great interest in [relying as 
little as possible on] psychology” (quoted in Busino 1964, xxiv), and regarded the 
purported elimination of psychological assumptions from consumer choice theory 
as one of his main theoretical achievements (see e.g. [1909] 1971, ch.2). Still, he 
granted that economic phenomena can be given psychological explanations, and 
claimed that “a day will come when we will be able to deduce the laws of the 
social science from the principles of psychology” (ibid., II, §1). For his part, 
Robbins ([1932] 1945) repeatedly emphasized that neoclassical economic theory 
does not rest on any specific psychology and that economists can validate their 
psychological assumptions via intuition and introspection without performing 
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psychological experiments. In particular, he adamantly insisted that “the 
hedonistic trimmings of the works of Jevons and his followers were incidental to 
the main structure of a theory which [can be] set out and defended in absolutely 
non-hedonistic terms” ([1932] 1945, 85-6). At the same time, he dismissed 
behaviourism as a ‘queer cult’, and held that it is often “impossible” to account 
for economic phenomena “unless we invoke elements of […] psychological 
nature” (ibid., 87-8).8 
 
As to Samuelson, his ‘Note’ declaredly aimed to drop off “the last vestiges of the 
utility analysis” (1938a, 62) and develop a strictly behaviourist theory of 
consumer choice. In the same years, however, he made substantive contributions 
to the derivation of ordinal utility theory’s implications for demand behaviour 
(see e.g. Samuelson, 1938b). Moreover, in later works he presented revealed 
preference theory as the derivation of “the full empirical implications for demand 
behavior of the most general ordinal utility analysis” (Samuelson, 1950, 369). I 
am not concerned here with establishing whether Samuelson ultimately 
relinquished his early behaviourist ambitions (see e.g. Hands, 2008 and 2009b, 
and Ross, 2009, for a recent debate about this issue). For present purposes, it 
suffices to note that Samuelson’s later contributions are not easily interpreted in 
purely behaviourist terms, and that it would be implausible to portray Samuelson 
as a leading economist whose sole aim was to free economic theory from 
psychological assumptions. More generally, the point remains that psychological 
interpretations of economic constructs have figured prominently in 20th century 
economic theory (see e.g. Guala, 2012, and Hausman, 2012, ch.7-8, on different 
interpretations of the notion of preference). Furthermore, various applications of 
economic theory rely on psychological findings and assumptions for their 
plausibility (see e.g. Lehtinen and Kuorikoski, 2007, on some applications of 
rational choice theory). 
 
Regarding the putative reunification between economics and neuro-psychology, it 
is useful to distinguish the descriptive issue whether a reunification between these 
disciplines is in fact under way and the normative issue whether those disciplines’ 
practitioners should promote and implement such reunification. I shall expand on 
the normative issue in the next section. As to the descriptive issue, the following 
remarks are in order. Over the last few decades, promising integrative advances 
have been made at the interface between economics and neuro-psychology. These 
advances range from the incorporation of psychological insights into standard 
economic models (see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, on cumulative prospect 
theory) to ongoing attempts to link neuroscientific measurements, observed 
behavioural responses, and formal choice theory through rigorous operational 
definitions (see e.g. Caplin et al., 2010, for an axiomatic test of the so-called 
reward prediction error hypothesis). In recent years, both behavioural and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 These claims are not inconsistent, but illustrate some of the tensions between Robbins’ 
diverse methodological commitments. For a detailed appraisal of Robbins’ position, see 
e.g. Hands, 2009a, and Sugden, 2009. 
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experimental economics have gained wide recognition among mainstream 
economists (see e.g. Nobel Press Release, 2002, on the Nobel Prize awarded to 
Kahneman and Smith for integrating “insights from psychological research into 
economic science” and establishing “laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical 
economic analysis”). According to some (see e.g. Shiller, 2011), it is only a 
matter of time before neuroeconomics attains a comparable standing. 
 
In light of these disciplinary developments, one might well maintain that 
interdisciplinary integration is a widely endorsed regulative ideal, and that the 
ongoing integrative advances foster significant progress at the interface between 
economics and neuro-psychology. Even so, the proponents of the standard view 
have hitherto failed to specify in what sense exactly these advances would 
constitute genuine unification between economics and neuro-psychology, as 
opposed to local integrations between particular research programs within these 
disciplines. This lack of specificity is problematic, because different authors 
advocate rather dissimilar (and often conflicting) integrative strategies (see e.g. 
Berg, 2014, on the proponents of distinct approaches to the modelling of bounded 
rationality). Furthermore, economics and neuro-psychology differ profoundly in 
their methodological presuppositions, employed constructs and explanatory aims 
(see e.g. Fumagalli, 2010 and 2014). These differences, in turn, severely hinder 
attempts to provide a unified interdisciplinary framework for modelling choice 
(see e.g. Fumagalli, 2015; see also Ross, 2011, on various differences between 
economists’ and psychologists’ conceptions of choice). 
 
Regrettably, several authors seem to overestimate the contribution of recent 
integrative advances to the alleged reunification between economics and neuro-
psychology. By way of illustration, consider Glimcher et al.’s conjecture that by 
combining economic and neuroscientific approaches, neuroeconomists will 
develop “a methodology for reconciling prescriptive and descriptive economics” 
(2005, 214). Neuroeconomists may employ descriptive findings concerning the 
neuro-psychological substrates of choice to inform standard economic analyses 
(see e.g. Fumagalli, 2013, on neuroeconomists’ attempts to complement choice-
based indicators of well-being). Yet, it is highly doubtful that neuroeconomists’ 
descriptive findings provide compelling insights regarding what people ought to 
choose in specific situations. As acknowledged by Glimcher, grounding 
prescriptive conclusions solely on neural findings is unwarranted not just because 
of current limitations in the reliability and accuracy of these findings, but also 
because such findings “are explicitly positive in nature” (2011, 412). 
 
 
3. Normative Evaluation 
 
 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the relationship between 20th century 
economic theory and neuro-psychological research may be plausibly 
reconstructed as a three-stage process of initial unity, increasing separation and 
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ongoing integration. Even so, there are several reasons to question recent calls to 
develop a unified interdisciplinary framework for modelling choice spanning 
economics and neuro-psychology. I already discussed some of these reasons in 
previous articles.9 In this section, I address two major challenges that prominent 
proponents of the standard view put forward regarding the relationship between 
economics and neuro-psychology. These two challenges target leading authors’ 
conception of economics as a separate science of rational choice independent of 
neuro-psychology (see e.g. Pareto, [1909] 1971, ch.1; see also Gul and 
Pesendorfer, 2008, for a recent defence of such conception). More specifically, 
the first challenge is “to find and to justify a definition of the domain of 
[economic theory] which is not vacuous [and] is wide enough for economics to 
have something useful to say about the real world” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 
171; see also Bardsley et al., 2010, ch.2). The second challenge is “to find 
consistency conditions for ‘rational’ preferences, secure enough to serve as the 
basis for reliable deductive inferences” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 171; see also 
Earl, 2005). 
 
According to the proponents of the standard view, economists have failed to 
address these two major challenges. In their view, “for most of the twentieth 
century” limits to the domain of economic theory “were not discussed [and] there 
was an [unsupported] implicit presumption that the theory was universal in its 
application” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 171; see also Sugden, 2001). Moreover, 
the preferences of economic agents “were assumed to satisfy strong axioms of 
consistency [that] were motivated on a priori grounds but not tested against the 
evidence” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 171; see also Giocoli, 2005). I shall critically 
examine these two claims in points 3.1 and 3.2 below. In doing so, I argue that 
recent calls to develop a unified interdisciplinary framework for modelling choice 
rest on disputable presuppositions concerning both the domain of economic 
theory and the relationship between this theory’s axiomatic foundations and 
empirical findings about the neuro-psychological substrates of choice. This does 
not per se imply that economics is plausibly regarded as a separate science of 
rational choice independent of neuro-psychology. Still, it challenges the 
proponents of the standard view to ground their calls for interdisciplinary 
unification on more plausible philosophical and methodological presuppositions. 
 
 
3.1 The Domain of Economic Theory 
 
Several criteria have been proposed to demarcate the domain of economic theory 
during the history of the discipline (see e.g. Backhouse and Medema, 2009, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See e.g. Fumagalli, 2011, on the epistemic and pragmatic trade-offs faced by recent 
attempts to incorporate neuro-psychological variables into economic models of choice; 
see also Fumagalli, 2015, on prominent authors’ divergences as to what disciplines are to 
provide the basic constructs for interdisciplinary unification across economics and neuro-
psychology.	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Maas, 2009). Two sets of demarcation criteria have been especially prominent 
among leading economists. On the one hand, some define the domain of 
economic theory in relation to the presence or the workings of specific causal 
factors. For instance, Marshall contends that economics “examines that part of 
the individual and social action which is most closely connected with […] the 
material requisites of the wellbeing” ([1890] 1920, 1; see also Mill, 1836, 318, for 
the claim that political economy investigates the operation of the causes 
underlying the production and distribution of wealth). On the other hand, others 
define the domain of economic theory in terms of particular features of choice. 
For example, Robbins characterizes economics as the science that “studies human 
behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses” ([1932] 1945, 16; see also Weber, [1904] 1949, 65, for the claim 
that economic motives concern the satisfaction of needs and desires in presence 
of scarce material means). 
 
These two sets of demarcation criteria point to different definitions of the domain 
of economic theory. Moreover, economists debated at length about the relative 
merits of such definitions. By way of illustration, Robbins’ definition was 
criticized by other economists both for being overly broad (see e.g. Buchanan, 
1964, 214) and for being exceedingly narrow (see e.g. Hutchison, 1938, 54) 
before becoming popular. Indeed, economists’ disagreements were so profound 
that several authors doubted the possibility of providing a single coherent 
definition of the domain of economic theory (see e.g. Fraser, 1932). These 
observations highlight some of the difficulties faced by economists’ attempts to 
precisely demarcate the domain of economic theory. At the same time, they make 
it dubious that “for most of the twentieth century” economists did not discuss 
limits to the domain of economic theory and implicitly presumed that “the theory 
was universal in its application” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 171). To be sure, some 
economists took their “analytic categories - scarcity, cost, preferences, 
opportunities, etc. - [to be] universal in applicability” (Hirshleifer, 1985, 53). Yet, 
even the staunchest advocates of mainstream economic theory typically argued - 
rather than presupposed - that their constrained optimization techniques could be 
applied to model phenomena that were previously deemed to be outside 
economics’ domain (see e.g. Becker, 1976, on racial discrimination and family 
relations). 
 
More generally, the two sets of demarcation criteria outlined above point to 
definitions of the domain of economic theory which seem “not vacuous [and] 
wide enough for economics to have something useful to say about the real world” 
(Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 171). This does not exempt economists from the 
alleged need to test economic theory within the domain delimited by these 
demarcation criteria (see point 3.2 below for discussion). Still, it challenges the 
proponents of the standard view to specify why exactly those demarcation criteria 
would be inadequate. In this respect, it would be overly restrictive to require 
economists to determine “whether any given class of behaviour falls in the 
domain of the theory, prior to testing the theory’s predictions about that 
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behaviour” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 156, italics added). For in primis, this 
requirement presupposes - rather than shows - that an adequate definition of the 
domain of economic theory must demarcate this domain in terms of 
predetermined classes of behaviour. And second, economists’ constrained 
optimization techniques have been recurrently applied to model classes of 
phenomena beyond those (e.g. human individuals’ choices) traditionally included 
into such domain (see e.g. Kagel, 1987, on animal foraging, and Glimcher, 2011, 
ch.6, on the activation patterns of specific neural areas). 
 
 
3.2 Testing Consistency Axioms  
 
As to economists’ purported failure to test specific consistency axioms against the 
available empirical evidence, the following remarks are worth making. Economic 
methodologists debated at length as to how the economic theory of choice fares in 
terms of specific criteria of empirical testability (see e.g. Blaug, 1992, ch.4, and 
Hands, 1985, on falsificationist criteria). In this context, several authors criticized 
economists for displaying “an endemic unwillingness […] to face up to empirical 
questions” (Sugden, 2001, 128; see also Earl, 2005, 917). The idea is that 
although economists frequently claim to value the possibility of testing economic 
theory’s consistency axioms against the available empirical evidence, they do not 
in fact abide by rigorous principles of theory testing. As Blaug put it, economists 
“preach the importance of submitting theories to empirical tests, but they rarely 
live up to their declared methodological canons” (1992, 243; see also Sugden, 
2008, for similar remarks). 
 
These criticisms invite the following two rejoinders. First, economists are 
commonly more open to test and modify economic theory’s consistency axioms 
than the standard view alleges. And second, many economists’ reliance on 
specific consistency axioms derives not so much from their purported 
unwillingness to confront recalcitrant empirical evidence, but rather from their 
adherence to justifiable principles of theory testing. Below I expand on these two 
rejoinders in turn, focusing on how economists responded to the empirical 
findings against standard EUT emerged since the 1950s. Standard EUT occupied 
centre stage in economic theorizing when these findings were initially presented 
(see Section 1). Hence, economists’ responses to such findings constitute an 
interesting test case for assessing economists’ theory testing practices. 
 
From the 1950s onwards, a wide array of behavioural findings have been claimed 
to cast doubt on the descriptive validity of EUT’s consistency axioms. These 
findings putatively demonstrated that individuals’ preferences violate such 
axioms in a variety of choice settings (see e.g. Aumann, 1962, on completeness, 
Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, on transitivity, and Allais, 1953, on 
independence). When these findings were first presented, many economists 
responded by doubting their reliability and robustness. In particular, several 
authors alleged that the collected findings were more likely to reflect peculiar 
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features of the examined choice settings than widespread violations of EUT (see 
e.g. Grether and Plott, 1979, on how learning and incentives tend to reduce some 
of the reported violations). EUT, however, came under increasing pressure when 
the systematic character of its violations was documented (see e.g. Kahneman et 
al., 1982, on the robustness of various violations of EUT to variations in 
experimental conditions). The systematic character of the documented violations 
prompted some to challenge not just the descriptive, but also the normative 
tenability of specific axioms (see e.g. Levi, 1986, on completeness, Sugden, 
1991, on transitivity, and Allais and Hagen, 1979, on independence). 
 
Economists developed three main lines of response to these challenges. Some 
attempted to insulate EUT from alleged disconfirming findings by delimiting the 
domain within which this theory can be legitimately tested (see e.g. Plott, 1996, 
on the discovered preference hypothesis, which states that EUT accurately 
predicts the decisions of agents who had sufficient opportunities and time to 
discover which actions best satisfy their preferences). Others defended the 
normative plausibility of EUT’s consistency axioms by pointing to the losses one 
may incur when violating these axioms and to individuals’ willingness to revise 
their choices once they realize that such choices violate specific axioms (see e.g. 
Hands, 2014, for a review of some such defences). Still others modified the 
axiomatic foundations of EUT so as to reconcile this theory’s implications with 
observed choice patterns (e.g. Aumann, 1962, relinquished completeness, 
Machina, 1982, abandoned independence, and McClennen, 1990, relinquished 
both completeness and independence). That is to say, economists did not 
uncritically take the collected findings to undermine EUT, but did not dismiss 
these findings either. On the contrary, they frequently responded to such findings 
by testing and modifying the axiomatic foundations of EUT. 
  
As to the justifiability of economists’ reliance on specific consistency axioms, it 
is instructive to consider the often-debated issue whether economists should 
apply strict falsificationist criteria to test EUT’s axioms. The empirical 
implications of EUT are typically conditional upon a variety of ceteris paribus 
qualifications and other auxiliary assumptions (see e.g. Caldwell, 1991). The very 
act of deriving testable implications from such theory often requires one to 
introduce auxiliary assumptions about test conditions (see e.g. Smith, 1991). 
Moreover, economists frequently have lower confidence in some of their 
auxiliary assumptions than in EUT’s consistency axioms (see e.g. Starmer, 1999). 
This by no means implies that economists “cannot perform […] controlled 
experiments” (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985, 8), or that “economics must be a 
non-laboratory science” (Lipsey, 1979, 39). Still, in many choice situations 
empirical findings contrary to EUT’s implications are more plausibly regarded as 
evidence against some of the auxiliary assumptions rather than evidence against 
the investigated axioms. Whenever this is the case, economists’ reliance on 
EUT’s consistency axioms can be plausibly accounted for in terms of justifiable 
principles of theory testing rather than a dogmatic commitment to such axioms 
(see e.g. Hausman, 1992, ch.12, on the so-called weak-link principle; see also 
	   16	  
Duhem, [1906] 1954, ch.6, and Quine, 1953, for similar remarks about 
hypotheses testing in other disciplines).10 
 
A proponent of the standard view may object that by performing a series of 
experimental reproductions economists can narrow down the set of potential 
sources of recalcitrant empirical evidence and test the validity of specific 
auxiliary assumptions (see e.g. Cubitt et al., 2001, on the adequacy of agents’ 
incentives). This objection is not without merit. Still, only a naïve falsificationist 
would argue that the availability of empirical findings contrary to EUT’s 
implications ipso facto undermines this theory’s consistency axioms. In this 
respect, it is telling that Popper himself emphasized that when a theory premised 
on the so-called rationality principle fails some empirical test, “it is sound 
methodological policy to decide not to make the rationality principle accountable 
but the rest of the theory” ([1967] 1985, 362).11 
 
A proponent of the standard view may further object that in spite of the 
difficulties involved in testing economic theory, EUT’s consistency axioms are 
empirically testable and often violated (see e.g. Glimcher, 2011, ch.5). In 
particular, she might allege that the availability of empirical findings contrary to 
specific consistency axioms makes it incumbent on economists to justify their 
reliance on these axioms. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this objection is 
correct. Even so, the availability of some empirical findings contrary to specific 
consistency axioms does not per se imply that economists’ reliance on these 
axioms is unjustified. For the justifiability of economists’ reliance on those 
axioms depends on a number of epistemic and pragmatic factors, ranging from 
the availability of alternative frameworks for modelling choice to what goals 
economists purport to achieve (e.g. predicting individuals’ choices, explaining 
observed choice patterns, articulating a normative theory of choice). By way of 
illustration, consider again the literature on the violations of EUT’s consistency 
axioms. As evidence of these violations accumulated, many competing accounts 
of those violations have been advocated (see e.g. Machina, 2008). Furthermore, 
no single parsimonious theory can plausibly account for the observed violations 
of the different axioms (see e.g. Harrison and Rutström, 2009). In this 
perspective, one may consistently hold that various theories outperform EUT for 
specific predictive and explanatory purposes, and yet insist that the EUT 
framework remains a valuable benchmark for both descriptive and normative 
theorizing (see e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Duhem’s thesis differs in several respects from the position later advocated by Quine 
(see e.g. Ariew, 1984). I gloss over these differences since the cogency of my remarks 
does not hinge upon such differences.	  
11 Several authors questioned the cogency of Popper’s remarks regarding the rationality 
principle (see e.g. Hands, 1985, Lagueux, 1993, and Nadeau, 1993). I am not concerned 
here with assessing the cogency of Popper’s remarks. For present purposes, it suffices to 
note that even the heralds of strict falsificationist criteria caution against unreflective 
applications of these criteria to evaluating the economic theory of choice.  
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To see this, let us examine the often-made comparison between EUT and 
cumulative prospect theory (henceforth, CPT), which Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) put forward as an alternative to EUT. CPT frequently outperforms EUT in 
fitting within-sample choice data thanks to the flexibility conferred by its extra 
parameters. However, such flexibility tends to hamper CPT’s out-of-sample 
predictive performance, and EUT is more robust than CPT against estimation 
errors in virtue of its simpler functional form (see e.g. Ross, 2014, ch.4). 
Moreover, CPT does not specify how exactly agents’ reference points are to be 
determined and how they vary across choices. This, in turn, constitutes a critical 
operational weakness of CPT (see e.g. Harrison and Rutström, 2008, sec.3, for 
some illustrations). To put it differently, the predictive and explanatory 
performance of EUT and CPT can vary remarkably depending on what choice 
problems one targets, and CPT falls short of providing a general-purpose 
alternative superseding EUT. This point holds not just for CPT, but also for 
several other works at the interface between economics and neuro-psychology. In 
fact, prominent neuro-psychological researchers criticize such works for having 
“little or no predictive power outside of their bounded domains” (Glimcher et al., 
2005, 214, on bounded rationality models) and for having “too many interacting 
parameters [to be] truly falsifiable” (Glimcher, 2011, 120, on original prospect 
theory). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In discussing the relationship between economics and other decision sciences, 
several authors caution against the temptation to provide grand claims concerning 
the relationships between entire scientific disciplines (see e.g. Guala, 2000, and 
Mäki, 1996). The idea is that interdisciplinary relationships are exceedingly 
complex and multifaceted to be constrained into a single overarching narrative. I 
agree with these cautionary remarks in spirit. Still, combining philosophical and 
methodological considerations can yield informative insights about the 
relationship between economics and neuro-psychology. In this article, I argued 
for three claims of general interest to the philosophers and the practitioners of 
these disciplines. First, contrary to the standard view, neoclassical economic 
theory was not grounded on psychological foundations. Second, the standard 
view significantly overstates economics’ alleged separation from psychology and 
implausibly downplays the role psychological findings, constructs and methods 
have played in 20th century economic theorizing. And third, the increasing 
integration between economics and neuro-psychology does not license the 
standard view’s claim that a reunification between these disciplines is under way. 
In particular, recent calls for interdisciplinary unification are premised on 
questionable presuppositions concerning both the domain of economic theory and 
the relationship between this theory’s axiomatic foundations and empirical 
findings about the neuro-psychological substrates of choice. This does not per se 
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imply that economics is plausibly regarded as a separate science of rational 
choice independent of neuro-psychology. Still, it challenges the proponents of the 
standard view to ground their calls for interdisciplinary unification on more 
plausible philosophical and methodological presuppositions. 
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